Deeply imbedded within the twin contexts of gang proliferation and drug market expansion is public concern about gang migration-the movement of gang members from one city to another. That concern is reflected in the reports of State legislative task force investigations; government-sponsored conferences; and law enforcement accounts at the local, State, and Federal levels.1 In these documents the evidence cited is most often anecdotal, rarely the result of a systematic assessment of the prevalence, nature, and consequences of gang migration . With a single exception, the findings of research on this topic contrast sharply with the perspective presented in the government and law enforcement reports as well as in the media. These research studies show that the impact of gang migration is far less than has been believed.2 The disparity between the empirically based studies and the law enforcement and media reports can be resolved through analysis of the patterns of gang migration. The study whose findings are summarized here examines these patterns by drawing on a nationwide sample of cities and reporting information from law enforcement, community informants, and gang members. The study revealed that although overall the pattern of migration and the characteristics of migrants point to a less dramatic effect than has been believed, variations in the dominant patterns may explain that belief. Because this study is the first to investigate gang migration systematically and on a national scope, it should be viewed as exploratory.3 (See "How the Information Was Gathered.") Gang migration, broadly defined, is widespread. Of the 190 larger cities (those with a population of more than 100,000),155 (80 percent) cited at least some migration, as did another 555 smaller cities. These cities are located throughout the country: 44 percent in the West, fewer in the Midwest and South (26 and 25 percent, respectively), and only about 5 percent in the Northeast. Gang migration is a recent phenomenon; relatively few cities (13 percent) report their first gang migration as occurring before 1986. In most cities the emergence of local, indigenous gangs either preceded the onset of migration (54 percent) or occurred the same year (41 percent); in just 5 percent, the onset of migration preceded the emergence of local gang problems. Numbers. Estimates of the total number of migrants vary widely, from as low as a dozen and under (30 percent of the 600 cities that could provide figures) up to the thousands (16 cities, or just 3 percent). A more reliable but still quite variable estimate is the number of migrants who arrived the previous year. Less than half (47 percent) of the cities reported the arrival of 10 or fewer migrants in that period, while only 34 (5 percent) estimated as many as 100 or more recent arrivals. Thus, although in recent years hundreds of cities have seen the arrival of gang members, their numbers have been relatively low. As a result, their potential for increasing local gang activity and crime rates would appear to be limited. More detailed information was drawn from interviews with law enforcement gang experts in the cities that reported at least 10 migrants in the previous year. Age, gender, ethnicity. For each of these cities, the migrants' age ranged from 13 to 30, with the typical age about 18 years. Female gang migrants were uncommon, as were Asians and whites. Compared with the ethnic distribution of gang members nationally, migrants were somewhat more likely to be black. About half the cities reported that at least 60 percent of their migrants were black; in 28 percent they were predominantly Hispanic. These characteristics are roughly similar to those of gangs in general. Place of origin. Where do gang migrants come from? Cities within the Los Angeles area were cited by 63 percent of the respondents. One-third mentioned Chicago area cities, with far fewer reporting the New York or Detroit areas. About one-fourth cited the city of Los Angeles (rather than the larger Los Angeles area) as their primary source of migrants; Chicago was noted by 14 percent. The primary source of migration was typically within 100 miles of the destination city; only 12 percent cited primary source cities more than 1,000 miles away. A regional migration pattern, or a clustering of three or more source cities within 30 miles of each other, was evident in about one-fourth of all cities. Motives/length of stay. The average length of stay was typically 3 months or longer; only about one-fourth of the cities reported typical visits shorter than a month. This pattern is consistent with the motivations for migration. When police officers were asked to select which of several reasons explained why most of the gang members who moved to their city did so, they cited family moves (39 percent) along with stays with relatives and friends. Combined into a category of "social" primary motivations, these reasons accounted for 57 percent of the cities. The second most frequently cited primary motivation was drug market expansion (20 percent of the cities). This the researchers combined with other criminal opportunity motivations to create a category of "extralegal attractions" that accounted for 32 percent of the total in the destination cities. The ways in which migrants participated in gangs in the destination cities exhibited no dominant pattern. In about one-third there was a prevailing pattern in which migrants recruited for former gangs or to establish branch operations. In about 20 percent, migrants largely joined pre-existing local gangs, and about the same percentage reported that migrants retained their affiliation with their former gang only. Few respondents felt that migrants discontinued gang activity altogether; however, this is difficult to determine, since individuals who ceased gang activity might be less likely to come to the attention of the police. Effect on crime. Most officers interviewed (86 percent) reported that migrants have had an impact on local crime rates or patterns, primarily through increases in thefts (50 percent of the cities). robberies (35 percent), other violent crimes (59 percent), and gun use or sophistication of firearms used (36 percent). Migrants were somewhat or heavily involved in drug sales in about three-fourths of the cities. according to the law enforcement respondents. This pattern extended to both black and Hispanic gang migrants, with rock or crack cocaine most commonly distributed by blacks, and marijuana by Hispanics. But despite the reportedly widespread involvement of gangs in drug sales. Gang migrants were generally not perceived as having a substantial impact on the local drug market, probably because of their relatively low numbers. These general characteristics might obscure more specific patterns that would have different implications for criminal justice response. The researchers examined motivations to migrate, involvement of migrants with drugs, and number of migrants and found that only on the first factor did differences emerge. The larger cities and cities in the South were more likely than other sites to attract migrants drawn by the prospect of extra-legal activities. Migrants to these cities also traveled longer distances, stayed less time. were more likely to be older, and tended to be black. In cities where social reasons for migration predominated, migrants were more likely to be Hispanic. Law enforcement officers were asked about the use of specific strategies and their effectiveness in reducing the volume of gang migrants or their impact. Most departments have not developed specific strategies to deal with gang migrants (e.g.. targeting of entry points). Many responded to questions about strategy by citing their gang intelligence and operational activities. Analysis revealed informational and operational coordination to he weak. Although the officers cited several strategies for dealing with gang migrants, including routine field contacts arrests, and use of informants. few viewed them as effective. Selective enforcement of violations (e.g., use of narcotics laws) and gang sweeps and other suppression strategies were less common but were perceived to be effective by a majority of officers. Although prevention was rarely mentioned (by 15 percent), it was considered effective by more than half the departments using it. The reasons for gang migration are far more complex than has been believed. Joint efforts with other agencies. Collaboration of the police with community agencies and institutions was reported in nearly two-thirds of the cities. most often taking the form of information exchange or gang awareness education. However, this rarely involved service referrals or direct participation in service provision. Although officers in more than half the cities viewed community collaboration as an effective response to migration. less than one-fourth could provide the name of someone outside law enforcement who was informed about gang migration. Lack of innovation. Not only were the strategies not viewed as particularly effective. but they did not meet the study's definition of "innovative and promising" responses to gang migration. The officers reported that they saw the adverse impacts of gang migration as substantial, yet their views were not reflected in departmental policy or systematic enforcement approaches. Only I X percent of the officers said their department sees gang migration as a severe problem. while fully one-third said their department sees it as a minor problem or not a problem. This departmental assessment may help explain the absence of innovation, and that absence also likely reflects the recent occurrence of migration and its relatively minor role in the overall gang problem in many cities. The interviews with community respondents revealed several locales that have recently recognized the problem and were just beginning to work with police. Of the 42 respondents, only four reported that no steps had been taken. But of those in which steps had been taken, only three mentioned migrants specifically. All three included the involvement of law enforcement and school or housing authority collaboration to identify migrants or to share information about newcomers. In the remaining responses, an array of prevention or intervention activities related to gangs or to crime generally-not to migrants-were noted. Over half specified distinct roles for law enforcement, a confirmation of the high levels of police/community collaboration reported in the interviews with police. Little attention was given to the development of coordinated responses to gang migration. Indepth studies of three cities that experienced a high volume of migration revealed that the reasons for migration are far more complex than has been believed. They also revealed a range of relationships between newcomers and established gangs, and great variety in the level and nature of connections with gangs in the departure sites. In general, migrants reported getting in less trouble with the law in their destination city. For policymakers the issue then becomes weighing such reduced gang activity against concern with the spread of gang culture from city to city. In all three cities, remedies were directed at gangs in general rather than gang migrants. One city adopted a social service approach geared to individuals. In another, there seemed to be little in the way of services directed to at-risk youth. Although the attempts to identify promising law enforcement and community strategies that address gang migration were not successful, the study findings suggest several directions that local and Federal policy might take. The findings indicate that the core policy issues are as follows: 1. Migration is not the cause of local gang problems. Most cities had local gangs before the onset of migration, and many respondents felt their city would have a gang problem regardless of migration. In view of the generally small number of migrants, it may be appropriate that there is little specificity in programs to deal with gangs and in law enforcement strategies. Communities are grappling with the root causes of gang activity, and they must continue to invest in targeted prevention and intervention. The variety of such programs described by community respondents, coupled with high levels of police-community collaboration, suggest that such efforts are under way in many cities. More active recruitment of gang migrants into these programs could yield benefits for them as well as for the larger community . 2. The adverse effects of migrants are substantial, according to law enforcement officers, yet few departments have policies or coherent strategies to address them. Special intervention strategies might be warranted if gang migrants present unique threats. However, the evidence to substantiate concern about this threat is mixed. Because the demographics of gang migrants are roughly similar to those of the country's gang population in general, there is little support for the contention that only the "worst" gang members migrate. This is not to say that the law enforcement accounts of substantial adverse effects on local gang dynamics and crime patterns should be dismissed. The data are necessarily perceptual, but the views of the officers interviewed were quite consistent--gang migrants commit a lot of crime and exacerbate local gang problems. In view of the officers' perceptions, the lack of departmental policies and strategies was surprising . 3. Different types of migration require different responses. The finding that drug market expansion and other illegal pursuits are the primary motivation in one-third of the cities indicates that judicious exercise of interdiction and suppression may be beneficial. However, a proactive social service policy might fare well even in these cities. Since social reasons were far more common as a migration motive, gang prevention and early intervention programs that provide alternative activities and opportunities may be more promising in these cities than aggressive law enforcement. 4. The need for developing a national file of gang members is not supported by the study. In the past few years, some Federal law enforcement agencies have joined with local police officials to promote establishment of a national file on gang members. In light of the findings of this study, the costs and benefits of such an undertaking should be weighed carefully. The majority of gang migrants were found not to travel great distances, so a national gang data base would not yield substantial benefits. On the other hand, because a substantial minority report clusters of "source cities" within 30 miles of one another, regional gang data bases may be useful. Future research should include systematically organized ethnographies of several carefully selected migration cities. Study of selected sites could much more effectively investigate migrants' influence on local gang cultures, the transition of gang members to their new environments, and the critical junctures in shifting gang identities. A nationwide survey of law enforcement should be repeated in order to update the findings reported here. Close attention should be paid to migration patterns. As the current study revealed, the primary reasons for relocation are associated with the characteristics of the migrants and the destination cities. Systematic assessment of response strategies, now in their infancy, is very much needed before more effective policies can be developed. As suggested here, some gang migrants may be responsive to social programming. Communities could be encouraged to provide such programs on an experimental basis and assess their effectiveness with gang migrants as well as with local gang clients and at-risk youths. The issues of foreign gang immigration and emigration, the diffusion of gang culture through the media, and criminal profiles of gang migrants also require further assessment. Migrants' individual histories of criminal activity should be investigated to identify the circumstances in which relocation to a different city might prove an effective crime reduction technique. Judges and family members employed this tactic years before gang migration studies were conducted. It is time that we identify the conditions in which such moves should be encouraged. 1. Bonfante, Jordan, "Entrepreneurs of Crack," Time, February 27, 1995; Hayeslip, D.W., Jr., "Local-Level Drug Enforcement: New Strategies," NIJ Reports, 213 (March-April 1989):2-6; California Council on Criminal Justice, State Task Force on Gangs and Drugs: Final Report, Sacramento, California: CCCJ, 1989; Genelin, M., and B. Copelin, Los Angeles Street Gangs: Report and Recommendations of the Countywide Criminal Justice Coordination Committee Interagency Gang Task Force, Los Angeles, California: Interagency Gang Task Force, 1989; McKinney, K.C., Juvenile Gangs: Crime and Drug Trafficking, Juvenile Justice Bulletin, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, September 1988; and National Drug Intelligence Center, Bloods and Crips Gang Survey Report, Johnstown, Pennsylvania: NDIC, 1994. 2. Rosenbaum, D.P., and J.A. Grant, Gangs and Youth Problems in Evanston, Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research, 1983; Hagedorn, John, People and Folks: Gangs, Crime, and the Underclass in a Rustbelt City, Chicago: Lakeview Press, 1988; Huff, C. Ronald, "Youth Gangs and Public Policy," Crime and Delinquency, 35 (1989): 524-537; Zevitz, R.G., and S.R. Takata, "Metropolitan Gang Influence and the Emergence of Group Delinquency in a Regional Community," Journal of Criminal Justice, 20 (1992):93-106; and Waldorf, Dan, "When the Crips Invaded San Francisco: Gang Migration," The Gang Journal, 1(4) (1993). The exception is the study by Skolnick, J.H., et al., "The Social Structure of Street Drug Dealing," American Journal of Police, 9(1) (1990):1-41; and Skolnick, Gang Organization and Migration, Sacramento, California: Office of the Attorney General of the State of California, 1990. 3. A related study is Maxson, Cheryl L., Street Gangs and Drug Sales in Two Suburban Cities, Research in Brief, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, September 1995 (NCJ 155185). 4. Information gathered from cities with drug gang migrants only is not included in this report but may be found in the final, unpublished report submitted to NIJ. Cheryl L. Maxson, Ph.D., is director of the Center for the Study of Crime and Social Control at the Social Science Research Institute, University of Southern California (USC). Kristi J. Woods is a doctoral candidate at USC. Malcolm W. Klein, Ph.D., is director of the USC Social Science Research Institute. The research for this study was supported by NIJ grant 91-1J-CX-K004. The full, final report will be available from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service. The authors gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Lea Cunningham and Karen Sternheimer and the field staff of Napa, Milwaukee, and Lawndale. Staff in the police departments and community agencies generously shared their knowledge, as did many gang members. Members of NIJ's Gangs Working Group contributed expertise in selecting case study sites.
Resolving the disparate views
National scope of gang migration
Characteristics of gang migrants and migration
Influence on local gangs and crime
Variations in the dominant pattern
Local responses to gang migration
Community response
Case studies
Policy implications
Future research
Notes